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Abstract
Compared with working alone, interacting in groups can increase dishonesty and give rise to collaborative cheating—the joint
violation of honesty. At the same time, collaborative cheating emerges some but not all of the time, even when dishonesty is
not sanctioned and economically rational. Here, we address this conundrum. We show that people differ in their extent to
follow arbitrary and costly rules and observe that “rule-followers” behave more honestly than “rule-violators.” Because rule-
followers also resist the temptation to engage in collaborative cheating, dyads and groups with at least one high rule-follower
have fewer instances of coordinated violations of honesty. Whereas social interaction can lead to a “social slippery slope” of
increased cheating, rule-abiding individuals mitigate the emergence and spreading of collaborative cheating, leading to a
transmission advantage of honesty. Accordingly, interindividual differences in rule following provide a basis through which
honest behavior can persist.
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Introduction
People like to see themselves as moral beings (Abeler et al.,
2014; Jordan et al., 2011; Mazar et al., 2008), and care
about what others think of them (Utikal & Fischbacher,
2013). As a result, individuals often abide by societal rules,
try to live up to ethical standards, and adapt their behavior
to fit culture-specific norms and rules of engagement
(Gelfand et al., 2011). Yet, people also frequently engage
in selfish or unethical behavior and deviate from social
norms and moral principles (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi,
2013; Heck et al., 2018; Shalvi et al., 2015). In short, indi-
viduals are often torn between pursuing selfish goals on the
one hand, and abiding by rules and norms that restrict this
pursuit of personal self-interest on the other hand.
Whereas one may expect individuals to engage in dishon-
esty especially when they are operating in social isolation,
research in psychology and economics rejects this intuition.
Unethical behavior such as cheating appears particularly pro-
minent when people operate in groups rather than alone
(Cohen et al., 2009; Conrads et al., 2013; Falk & Fischba-
cher, 2002; Gino et al., 2013; Kocher et al., 2017). For
example, dishonesty increased after witnessing one group
member ostentatiously cheat for personal gain, leading to a
“social” slippery slope of increasing dishonesty (Gino et al.,
2009; see also Diekmann et al., 2015; Köbis et al., 2017;
Soraperra et al., 2017). Likewise, Weisel and Shalvi (2015)
observed that individuals systematically coordinate cheating
behavior. In a dyadic die-rolling task, two individuals pri-
vately threw a die and earned money if they reported to have
thrown the same number. Participants reported to have
thrown a “double” 82% of the time, a number that not only
exceeds chance (16.6%) but also what individuals reported
when having the same monetary incentive to lie but acting
alone. This form of collaborative cheating (that the authors
also coin “corrupt collaboration”) is reminiscent of the
widely publicized scandals in the automotive and financial
industries in which professionals initiate and reinforce each
other’s dishonest behavior within their group or organization
(e.g., Enron or Diesel scandal; Goodman, 2015; also see
Gino et al., 2013; Wiltermuth, 2011).
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The emergence and persistence of collaborative cheating
raises the question how honesty can prevail in groups or
society at large. How can we reconcile that group interaction
can provide fertile grounds for collaborative cheating while
honesty and fairness is valued? What mechanism explains
that honesty is adhered to and persists across societies even
when norm violations and acts of dishonesty are serving
personal interests, are difficult to monitor, and are formally
not sanctioned? Here, we address this conundrum by taking a
person  situation perspective. We build on previous find-
ings that showed that individuals differ in their propensity to
follow rules, even when rules are arbitrary and abiding by
them is financially costly. We show that “rule-followers” are
more resilient to social influence than “rule-violators.”
Because collaborative cheating takes “two to tango,” one
individual scoring high on rule following mitigates the emer-
gence of coordinated lying.
Individuals Differ in Their Propensity to Follow Rules
Distinct lines of research converge on the idea that humans
often comply with rules and regulations. Whether we con-
sider work on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963), social
conformity and norm compliance (Stubbersfield et al.,
2019), or adherence to culture-specific rules such as “wait
until the light turns green,” or “thou shall not cheat” (Gelfand
et al., 2011), people often abide by rules. It has been argued
that deviations from rules generate a psychological cost
(Abeler et al., 2014; Gross & De Dreu, 2017; Kimbrough
& Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018; Krupka & Weber, 2013) and
create a cognitive conflict between what one should and
wants to do (Pfister et al., 2019; Schelling, 1984).
Yet, people also vary in the extent to which they obey
authority (Gross et al., 2018a; Haslam & Reicher, 2012), con-
form to group norms (Hodges & Geyer, 2016), or stick to rules
and regulations (Bicchieri, 2005; Bicchieri et al., 2020). Simi-
larly, people differ in cheating rates and their willingness to lie
for profit (Heck et al., 2018; Hilbig & Zettler, 2015). These
disparate findings combined suggest that people systemati-
cally differ in the value they derive from abiding by rules and/
or the disutility incurred when violating rules (Gross & De
Dreu, 2017; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; Kimbrough & Vostro-
knutov, 2016, 2018). Indeed, others before us have shown that
individual differences that are conceptually or empirically
related to rule following, such as guilt proneness and hon-
esty–humility, correlate with ethical conduct and shying away
from delinquent behavior (Fleeson et al., 2014; Heck et al.,
2018; Hilbig & Zettler, 2015).
Whether and how interindividual differences in rule fol-
lowing may shape social interactions, and in particular the
extent to which group members engage in collaborative cheat-
ing, is open to debate. One possibility is that groups engage in
collaborative cheating already when at least a few individuals
have low rule-following propensity (the proverbial rotten
apple that spoils the barrel), and are drawing their more honest
rule-following partners into increasingly dishonest behavior.
This would resonate with the observation of increased cheat-
ing rates in teams and groups compared with individuals
(Cohen et al., 2009; Conrads et al., 2013; Falk & Fischbacher,
2002; Gino et al., 2009, 2013; Kocher et al., 2017; Weisel &
Shalvi, 2015). It would also imply that rule-followers adapt to
the dishonesty of rule-violators rather than the other way
around, leading to a crowing out effect of honesty, similar
to how selfishness of few individuals can crowd out cooper-
ation in social dilemmas (e.g., Gross et al., 2016).
An alternative possibility, however, is that collaborative
cheating may fail to emerge and honesty persists already
when few group members have a high propensity to follow
rules. First, rule-followers may be more resilient to social
influence and do not go along with other’s deceitful initia-
tives and, second, displays of honesty by rule-followers may
signal that cheating is not acceptable. Evidence pointing to
this latter possibility comes from research showing that peo-
ple not only systematically differ in the extent to which they
cheat (Cohen et al., 2012; Fleeson et al., 2014; Heck et al.,
2018; Hilbig & Zettler, 2015) but also that some people are
better at resisting selfish temptations (Gino et al., 2011) and
are more resilient to social influence (Trevino, 1986).
Furthermore, appealing to ethical norms can increase hon-
esty (Cohn et al., 2014; Hallsworth et al., 2017), and cheating
seems highly malleable to monitoring and the possibility that
lies are detected (Rosenbaum et al., 2014). Possibly, being
confronted with a rule-follower may also increase self-
awareness, which has been shown to decrease cheating
(Diener & Wallbom, 1976). Because collaborative cheating
requires to coordinate unethical misconduct, already one
rule-follower may be able to successfully inhibit its success.
Evidence for this latter possibility would point to rule fol-
lowing as a mechanism underlying the “stickiness” of hon-
esty, explaining why honesty can persist even when local
group interactions offer opportunities for self-serving and
coordinated dishonesty. We return to this upon reporting the
results of Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we empirically tested whether interindivi-
dual differences in a behavioral rule-following task (Gross &
De Dreu, 2017; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018)
predict honesty when cheating is tempting and not formally
punished. In this task, participants have to place balls in one
of two buckets. One bucket generates more income than the
other bucket, yet the rule given to participants is to place the
balls in the less profitable bucket. Even when the rule is
strictly arbitrary, not justified, and no monitoring or formal
sanctioning is present, some participants go along with the
rule and earn less money from the task, whereas others per-
sistently violate the rule and benefit financially (Gross et al.,
2018a; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018; Thomsson
& Vostroknutov, 2017). Behavioral rule following in this
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simple task correlates with personal need for structure (Gross
& De Dreu, 2017), predicts normative behavior in social
dilemma situations, and respecting norms such as trust and
pro-sociality (Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018). A
recent brain stimulation study also revealed that rule follow-
ing is causally linked to the right lateral prefrontal cortex, a
brain region that has been associated with value-based cost–
benefit decisions (Gross et al., 2018a).
Honesty was measured using the die-roll task, in which
each participant throws a die under a cup—so that only he
or she can see the number thrown—and reports the outcome
for which the participant gets paid depending on the
reported number (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;
Shalvi et al., 2011). Because the die-roll is strictly private,
participants can dishonestly report a higher number than
they actually threw. Lying can be detected from significant
deviations from the probability of each number being
thrown (i.e., 16.7%; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;
Gerlach et al., 2019). Earlier work revealed that lying in
the die-roll task is correlated with unethical behaviors such
as not paying for public transport (Dai et al., 2017), being
absent from work without a reason (Hanna & Wang, 2017),
not returning undeserved pay (Potters & Stoop, 2016), mis-
behaving in school (Cohn & Maréchal, 2017), and diluting
milk with water in a dairy market (Kröll & Rustagi, 2017).
Both the rule-following task and the cheating task con-
front participants with a situation in which a rule prohibits to
obtain monetary reward. Based on this conceptual similarity
and results from previous research, it follows straightfor-
wardly that rule following should predict honesty. Still, we
deemed it important to establish such a link empirically for
two reasons. First, previous research has shown that beha-
vioral rule-following is correlated with normative behavior
in social dilemma situations and prosocial choice, but has
not investigated honesty in a cheating task. Second, rule-
following is explicitly based on a demand effect—people are
told to follow a specific rule—whereas rule violations such
as lying in the die-rolling task are more obfuscated and peo-
ple are not directly primed with the possibility that they
could lie for profit.
Method and Materials
Participants and ethics. We invited 70 subjects for a two-part
experiment. Sample size was determined assuming a
medium effect size (d ¼ 0.3), based on previous data on
interindividual difference measures and strategic behavior
in economic games (Gross & De Dreu, 2019; Gross et al.,
2018b; Hilbig & Zettler, 2015) with b ¼ .8 and a ¼ .05,
resulting in a target sample size of N ¼ 64 (based on
G-Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007).
The study received ethics approval from our Psychology
Ethics Board. Subjects provided written informed consent
and were debriefed upon completion of the studies. The
experiments did not involve any deception and subjects were
paid for participating at 6.50 €/hr and for their decisions
during the experimental tasks. After the first task, partici-
pants were scheduled for a second appointment based on the
experimental schedule and availability of the subject. Five
participants failed to show up for their second appointment
and did not respond to our contact attempts (dropout rate of
7%). Importantly, first-part behavior (measured rule follow-
ing) of responders and nonresponders did not differ, two-
sample t test, t(68) ¼ 0.29, p ¼ .78, two sided. Results are
based on all participants who took part in both parts of the
studies (n¼ 65, 57 female, Mage¼ 20.80 years, SDage¼ 3.51
years).
Experimental procedures. Upon arrival, participants were
assigned to an individual cubicle with a computer in front
of them displaying the instructions. In the first part of the
experiment, subjects engaged in the incentivized rule-
following task (Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018).
Each subject had to place 30 balls in either a blue or yellow
bucket on a computer screen. It was explained that for each
ball they put in the blue bucket, they would receive €0.05 and
for each ball they put in the yellow bucket they would
receive €0.10. They then read that “the rule is to put the balls
in the blue bucket.” Hence, following the rule was costly,
whereas violating the rule was beneficial for the subject,
creating a conflict between following rules and maximizing
monetary payoff. As in previous studies, no reason was given
for following the rule, and participants would not face any
negative consequences for violating the rule (Gross & De
Dreu, 2017; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018;
Thomsson & Vostroknutov, 2017). We thus measured ten-
dencies to follow rules in the absence of external enforce-
ment (i.e., punishment or reward).
Participants were reinvited after 8.4 days on average (see
supplemental material for further details). Prior to participa-
tion, participants only knew that the second part of the
experiment would take 30 min. In the second part, each
participant was again assigned to an individual cubicle with
a computer and was given a die and a cup. Their task was to
throw the die for six consecutive rounds, each time looking at
the outcome and reporting the outcome to the computer
(Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). It was explained to
participants that one random round would be selected by the
computer at the end of the task and the participant would
earn half of the reported outcome worth in euro (i.e., if the
participant reported a 1, they earned €0.50 extra; for a 2, they
earned €1 extra, and so on). Hence, there was an incentive to
misreport the die-rolls to maximize additional earnings. Par-
ticipants were informed that they would be paid the sum of
money they earned across both sessions only after the second
session, that experimenters could not monitor their behavior
in the first or second session, and only had access to the total
sum of money participants earned to pay participants.
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Results
Many participants actually followed the rule of the rule-
following task completely, despite the economic incentive
to do the opposite (Figure 1a). There also was considerable
variability in rule following across participants (M ¼ 22.20,
SD ¼ 9.21). Figure 1b shows that the distribution of die-roll
reports deviated from what would be expected if people
reported their outcome honestly, M ¼ 3.86, one-sample
t test, t(64) ¼ 3.15, p ¼ .003, two sided.
As predicted, rule following was significantly correlated
with the reports in the die-rolling task obtained about 1 week
later (Spearman r ¼ .29, p ¼ .02, two sided). The more
people followed the rule, the lower their average reported




Having established that individuals differ in rule following,
and that rule following predicts future honesty, we asked
how “sticky” rule following-based honesty is in social inter-
actions. Experiment 2 combined the rule-following task with
the incentivized dyadic die-rolling task (Weisel & Shalvi,
2015) to investigate whether people with a lower propensity
to follow rules adapt to the behavior of people with a higher
propensity to follow rules, or vice versa. In the dyadic die-
rolling task, coordinated cheating by misreporting individual
die-rolls is financially beneficial for both parties, whereas
honesty is costly.
As noted at the outset, one possibility is that rule following
predicts general adherence to societal norms, including those
asking people to behave honestly, but not when in close inter-
action with others. Whereas rule-followers may not initiate
cheating, they may still be sensitive to social influence and
local expectations for self-serving behavior. Thus, if social
interactions draw even rule-abiding individuals into violating
rules of honesty, we should see low levels of collaborative
cheating only when groups are composed of rule-following
individuals, and to emerge already when one group member
has a low propensity to follow rules (and invites collaborative
cheating). Alternatively, it may be that more rule-abiding indi-
viduals are not only more honest but also resist social influence,
preventing collaborative cheating to emerge and develop.
Indeed, societies often construe abiding by norms as a reflec-
tion of moral development or character (Bicchieri, 2005),
which may help individuals to shield themselves from peer
influence and temptations (Fleeson et al., 2014; Ścigała et al.,
2018). If true, low rule-abiding individuals should show the
opposite pattern. While having a higher willingness to cheat
for profit in social isolation, as we saw in Experiment 1, rule-
violators should be more susceptible to social influence and
adapt to displays of honesty. This we tested in Experiment 2.
Method and Materials
Participants and ethics. We invited 136 subjects for a two-part
experiment. The study received ethics approval from our Psy-
chology Ethics Board. Because a priori power calculations for
multilevel repeated-measure designs are complex and depend
on many a priori assumptions (Gelman & Hill, 2006), sample
size was determined based on the number of independent














































Figure 1. Rule following and honesty.
Extent of rule following based on 30 balls for which participants had to decide whether to place each of them according to a costly rule or not
(a) and distribution of die-roll reports in the second part of Experiment 1 (b). Red line indicates the distribution expected by chance (i.e.,
honesty). The extent of rule following in Part 1 and average die-roll reports, as a proxy for cheating, was negatively correlated (c). Red line
shows the linear regression fit. Dotted lines indicate the 90% confidence interval of the regression fit.
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observations per condition (group level) in previous literature
with similar design features (Abbink, 2004; Gino et al., 2009;
Gross et al., 2018b; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015).
Subjects provided written informed consent and were
debriefed upon completion of the study. The experiment did not
involve any deception and subjects were paid for participating at
6.50 €/hr and for their decisions during the experimental tasks.
After the first task, participants were scheduled for a second
appointment based on the experimental schedule and participant
availability. Eighteen participants failed to show up for their
second appointment and did not respond to our contact attempts
(dropout rate of 13%). Importantly, first-part behavior of respon-
ders and nonresponders did not significantly differ, two-sample t
test, t(134)¼ 0.56, p¼ .58, two sided. Results are based on all
participants who took part in both parts of the studies (n¼ 118,
93 female, Mage ¼ 22.42 years, SDage ¼ 4.50 years).
Experimental procedures. As in Experiment 1, participants first
performed the rule-following task (see procedure of Experi-
ment 1). Participants were reinvited in pairs after around 2
weeks, on average. Pairs were constructed as follows. Based
on the median rule following of the sample (median ¼ 20
balls), we split the sample into “high” (H) and “low” (L)
rule-followers. Participants were reinvited either in pairs of
two high rule-followers (HH teams, n ¼ 42), two low rule-
followers (LL teams, n¼ 38), or mixed pairs comprised of one
person scoring high and one person scoring low on rule fol-
lowing (HL teams, n ¼ 38; Figure 2a). Prior to participation,
participants only knew that the second part of the experiment
would take 60 min and that they would interact with another
participant. Each team engaged in the dyadic die-rolling task
(Figure 2b). In this task, each team member privately rolls a
die and is told to report the outcome of their die-roll to the
computer. If the team reports to have rolled exactly the same
number (a “double”), they get paid according to the worth of
the double. For example, if both team members reported to
have rolled a “1,” they got paid 1€ split equally among them.
If they both reported a “6,” they got paid 6€ split equally
among them. If they did not report a double (e.g., one reports
a “1” and the other reports a “6”), they did not receive any
payment. Hence, there was an incentive to coordinately mis-
report the die-rolls to maximize profits.
To further examine whether (a) a team of high rule-
followers (HH) lies less than a team of low rule-followers
a
b
Figure 2. Experimental design.
In the first part (a), participants were confronted with a costly rule that demanded to put each ball into the blue rather than the yellow
bucket. Participants were categorized as high (H) or low (L) rule-followers based on the number of balls participants allocated according to
the rule. In Experiment 2, they were then assigned to pairs of high rule-followers (HH teams), low rule-followers (LL teams), or mixed pairs
of one high and one low rule-follower (HL teams). Participants were reinvited in these teams of two and played the dyadic die-rolling task (b).
In this task, the first mover (A) rolls a die and reports the outcome to the second mover (B). The second mover then rolls an independent die
and reports the outcome to A. If they both report to have thrown the same number (a “double”), they get paid according to the value of the
double. After each round, the role (first mover/second mover) is switched.
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(LL), and (b) whether in teams with mixed types, high rule-
followers influence the behavior of low rule-followers more
than the other way around, the dyadic die-rolling task was
played sequentially (Figure 2b). Specifically, in each round,
there was a first mover and a second mover. The first mover
reported her die-roll first. The second mover then saw the
report of the first mover on her computer screen before roll-
ing her die. Then, the second mover reported her die-roll to
the computer. The first mover, not knowing what the second
mover would report, can “set the stage” and determine the
potential worth of a double by lying (e.g., reporting a six for
maximum potential gain). The second mover, knowing the
report of the first mover, can then “get the job done” by
matching the reported number of the first mover (e.g., also
reporting a six). As such, the first mover cannot guarantee
any payoff by lying, whereas the second mover cannot deter-
mine the value of a double but can guarantee a payoff above
zero by matching the reported number of the first mover. At
the end of each round, both participants received a summary
showing the reported die-rolls and the payoff for this round
(see supplemental material for details on the computer inter-
face and instructions). After each round, the role of first and
second movers was switched and each team interacted for 12
rounds. The first mover in Round 1 was determined ran-
domly. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were paid based
on their decisions in the rule-following task and one ran-
domly selected round from the dyadic die-rolling task, in
addition to their participation fee. Participants were paid the
sum of money they earned across both experimental sessions
after the second session. Experimenters could not monitor
the behavior of participants in the first or second session and
only had information about the sum of money that a partici-
pant earned after the second session to be able to pay
participants.
Analyses. Because individual data points are clustered in indi-
viduals (across time) and teams (influence of partner), we
fitted Bayesian multilevel regression models using STAN
(Carpenter et al., 2017) as implemented in the brms
R-package (Bürkner, 2017) for our two dependent variables:
reported die-roll reports and doubles. Consequently, we
report the 95% Bayesian confidence interval (CI) instead
of p values for these models. Note that, because we used
noninformative priors (see below), a 95% Bayesian CI that
only contains negative or positive values can be interpreted
as significant at a p ¼ .05 two-sided threshold from a fre-
quentist perspective. Using a frequentist approach based on
maximum likelihood estimation (as implemented in the lme4
package in R) did not change our conclusions, but we
decided to fit Bayesian models because they are widely rec-
ommended for multilevel modeling (Browne & Draper,
2006; Carpenter et al., 2017) and allowed us to restrict the
variance of the dependent variable via priors. Die-roll reports
were modeled as hierarchically clustered in subjects (Level
2) and teams (Level 3), estimating two hierarchically clus-
tered random intercepts (see Equation 1).
yijk ¼ b0jk þ b1X1ijk þ eijk ; eijk*Nð0;s2Þ ðLevel 1Þ
b0jk ¼ b0k þ e0jk ; e0jk*Nð0;s2e0jk Þ ðLevel 2Þ ð1Þ
b0k ¼ b0 þ e0k ; e0k*Nð0;s2e0k Þ ðLevel 3Þ
where k ¼ team; j ¼ subject; i ¼ decision:
Because changes in die-roll reports are restricted to lie
between 6 and 6, we used noninformative uniform priors
for each predictor (min ¼ 6, max ¼ 6) forcing the para-
meters in the model to respect the fact that the true average
responses have to lie within this range. For double reports, we
fitted a Bayesian multilevel logistic regression because the
dependent variable is binary. Furthermore, for double reports,
we only have one observation per team and round and hence
only needed to estimate one random intercept for each team.
For each model, we used four chains with 10.000 itera-
tions (5.000 burn-in iterations). For group-level effects of
each grouping factor, we used the default option of the prior
function, which restricts the variance to be nonnegative and
following a half student t distribution with three degrees of
freedom and a scale parameter that depends on the standard
deviation of the response variable. The Gelman–Rubin sta-
tistic was below 1.05 for all parameters, indicating good
mixing of the chains and thus high convergence.
Results
As in Experiment 1, subjects rolled their die in private, pro-
hibiting us to determine whether individual reports were
honest or not. However, average die-roll reports were signif-
icantly above what would be expected by chance, M ¼ 3.88,
one-sample t test, t(58) ¼ 4.89, p < .001, two sided, indicat-
ing that subjects engaged in lying to some degree.
Reported numbers. A team of low rule-followers (LL) system-
atically reported higher numbers (M ¼ 4.19) compared with
a team of high rule-followers (HH; M ¼ 3.73, Figure 3a,
Bayesian multilevel regression, HH vs. LL, b ¼ 0.46, 95%
CI ¼ [0.11, 0.81]; Table 1). The reported die-roll outcomes
of mixed teams (HL; one high type interacting with one low
type, M ¼ 3.71) were systematically lower compared with
LL teams (Bayesian multilevel regression, HL vs. LL,
b ¼ 0.48, 95% CI ¼ [0.84, 0.12]). On the contrary,
mixed teams were statistically indistinguishable from high
rule-follower teams (Figure 3a, Bayesian multilevel regres-
sion, HH vs. HL, b ¼ 0.02, 95% CI ¼ [0.38, 0.34];
Table 1). This pattern speaks to the possibility that high
rule-followers influenced low rule-followers rather than the
other way around. Importantly, however, changes in average
reported numbers across team compositions cannot unequi-
vocally be interpreted as a sign of social influence and should
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be interpreted with caution as the following thought experi-
ment demonstrates. Assuming that LL teams would perfectly
coordinate on reporting the highest number possible, we
would expect an average die-report of LL ¼ 6. Assuming
that HH teams would stay perfectly honest, we would expect
an average die-report of HH ¼ 3.5. If we further assume that
high and low types do not change their behavior in HL teams,
we would expect an average report of (6 þ 3.5) / 2 ¼ 4.75
when the low type is in the first-mover position, reporting a
6. When the low type is in the second-mover position, we
would expect an average report of (3.5 þ 3.5) / 2 ¼ 3.5 (the
high rule-follower, as a first mover, reports honestly, and the
low rule-follower, as the second mover, always matches the
first mover’s number). Across rounds, we would hence
expect an average report of HL ¼ (3.5 þ 4.75) / 2 ¼ 4.125
in mixed teams. Note that this number is closer to the HH
expectation than the LL expectation: e(HL)  e(HH) ¼
4.125  3.5 ¼ 0.625 < 1.875 ¼ 6  4.125 ¼ e(LL) 
e(HL). In other words, even without any social influence
taking place between types, we would expect lower average
die-reports in mixed teams. The measure of average die-
reports can, hence, only provide some preliminary evidence
that high rule-followers do not start to imitate low rule-
followers, but not the other way around. To show that high
rule-followers actually influenced the behavior of low rule-
followers, we need to investigate double rates (for which the
expectation of HL teams based on the above outlined
assumptions lie in the middle of HH and LL teams, see
supplemental material for a derivation) and look at the
individual-level behavior of types across the first-mover and
second-mover position.
Doubles. Teams containing two people scoring high on rule
following (HH) reported to have thrown a double in 37% of
the rounds. Teams containing two low rule-followers (LL)
reported doubles in 58% of the rounds on average, an
increase of 21% (Figure 3b, Bayesian multilevel regression,
HH vs. LL, b ¼ 1.11, 95% CI ¼ [0.44, 1.81]; Table 2). The
reported double rate of mixed teams (42%) was lower than
the double rate of low rule-follower teams (58%; Bayesian
multilevel regression, HL vs. LL, b ¼ 0.84, 95%
CI ¼ [1.55, 0.16]). However, the likelihood of reporting
a double in mixed teams was statistically indistinguishable
from high rule-follower teams (42% vs. 37%; Figure 3b,
Bayesian multilevel regression, HH vs. HL, b ¼ 0.27, 95%
CI ¼ [0.40, 0.94]; Table 2). The results provide evidence
that high rule-followers were able to increase honesty in low
rule-followers and mitigate the extent of collaborative cheat-
























































































Figure 3. Rule following and collaborative cheating in pairs.
Average die-roll reports (a) and average percentage of doubles (b)
across conditions. HH ¼ pair of two high rule-followers, LL ¼ pair
of two low rule-followers, HL ¼ team of both types. White line
indicates expectation based on chance (i.e., full honesty). Black
connection lines indicate mean differences for which the Bayesian
95% confidence intervals do not overlap. Average die-roll reports
of first movers (“setting the stage”; c) and percentage of matching
the number reported by the first mover (“getting the job done”; d)
of low rule-followers (black) and high rule-followers (blue) when
interacting with the same type (homogeneous pair) or with the
opposite type (mixed pair). Error bars show the standard error
of the mean.
Table 1. Random-Effects Regression Predicting Die-Roll Reports
Based on Team Composition.
95% CI
Coefficient Estimate SE L U
Intercept (HH teams) 3.49 0.15 3.20 3.78
HL teams 0.02 0.18 0.38 0.34
LL teams 0.46 0.18 0.11 0.81
Round 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06
slevel 1 1.62 0.03 1.56 1.68
slevel 2 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.34
slevel 3 0.44 0.07 0.30 0.59
Note. HH ¼ pair of two high rule-followers; HL ¼ mixed pair of one person
scoring high on rule following paired with one person scoring low on rule
following; LL¼ pair of two low rule-followers. s refers to the error term on
the individual-decision level (Level 1), subject level (Level 2), or team level
(Level 3) following Equation 1.
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high numbers and “setting the stage” as a first mover may not
pay off anymore, once paired with a high rule-follower who
is unwilling to “play along.” This is a direct path of how high
rule-followers may discourage lying of low rule-followers.
In the second-mover position, low rule-followers can guar-
antee payoff by simply matching the reported number of the
first mover. Yet, high rule-followers can influence the poten-
tial payoff by “setting a lower stage” (i.e., through honest
reporting). We call this an indirect path of how high rule-
followers may discourage lying of low rule-followers,
because a low rule-follower should still match any number
reported by a high rule-follower in the second-mover posi-
tion from a rational money-maximization perspective.
We found evidence that high rule-followers influenced
low rule-followers through both the direct and the indirect
paths. First, low rule-followers decreased their reports in
the first-mover position (“setting the stage”), once paired
with a high rule-follower rather than a like-minded low
rule-follower (Figure 3c, Bayesian multilevel regression,
Lmixed, b¼0.81, 95% CI¼ [1.44,0.20]). Second,
low rule-followers decreased their likelihood to match the
number of the first mover (“getting the job done”) when
interacting with a high rule-follower (Figure 3d, Bayesian
multilevel regression, L  mixed, b ¼ 1.11, 95%
CI ¼ [2.19, 0.04]). In contrast, high rule-followers did
not significantly change their “setting” and “getting” beha-
vior across team compositions (setting: Bayesian multilevel
regression, H: homogeneous vs. mixed, b ¼ 0.03, 95%
CI ¼ [0.48, 0.43]; getting: Bayesian multilevel regres-
sion, H: homogeneous vs. mixed, b ¼ 0.21, 95%
CI ¼ [0.74, 1.15]).
Discussion and Introduction
to Experiment 3
Results of Experiment 2 provide evidence against the social
slippery slope hypothesis. Results were consistent with the
alternative possibility, namely, that individuals with a
stronger propensity to follow rules resist the temptation to
engage in collaborative cheating. High rule-followers were
both less likely to “set the stage” by misreporting die-rolls, and
less likely to “get the job done” by adapting their reporting to
match the number reported by their peer. As a result, we
observed high levels of collaborative cheating only in dyads
consisting of two individuals scoring low on rule following. As
soon as one member scored high on rule following, collabora-
tive cheating dropped. Metaphorically speaking, coordinating
dishonesty takes two to tango and rule-followers refused to
dance.
In Experiment 3, we aimed to test whether this transmis-
sion advantage of honesty also generalizes to dyadic inter-
actions in small groups when high rule-followers are in the
minority (vs. majority). To this end, we examined collabora-
tive cheating in dyadic interactions within four-person
groups containing 0, 1, 3, or 4 individuals scoring high on
rule following (and, thus, 4, 3, 1, or 0 individuals scoring low
on rule following). Across trials, individuals changed inter-
action partners, so that in groups with one high rule-follower,
low rule-followers were sometimes paired to a high rule-
follower and sometimes with a fellow low rule-follower.
Based on Experiment 2, we expected the low rule-
followers to adapt to the high rule-follower’s (honest) beha-
vior more than the other way around, decreasing group-level
collaborative cheating even when only one high rule-
follower is present. The other way around, a group of high
rule-followers should be less influenced by one low rule-
follower in the group.
Method and Materials
Participants and ethics. We invited 195 subjects for a two-part
experiment. The study received ethics approval from our
Psychology Ethics Board. Subjects provided written
informed consent and were debriefed upon completion of
the study. The experiment did not involve any deception and
subjects were paid for participating at 6.50 €/hr and for their
decisions during the experimental tasks. After the first task,
participants were scheduled for a second appointment based
on the experimental schedule and availability of the subject.
Twenty-seven participants failed to show up for their second
appointment and did not respond to our contact attempts
(dropout rate of 14%). Importantly, first-part behavior of
responders and nonresponders did not significantly differ,
two-sample t test, t(193)¼0.01, p¼ .99. Results are based
on all participants who took part in both parts of the study (n
¼ 168, 128 female, Mage¼ 22.45 years, SDage¼ 4.39 years).
Because a priori power is difficult to estimate for multilevel
repeated-measure designs, sample size was determined
based on the number of independent observations per condi-
tion (group level) like in Experiment 2.
Experimental procedures. Participants first performed the rule-
following task (see procedure of Experiment 1) and we split
Table 2. Random-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Double
Reports Based on Team Composition.
95% CI
Coefficient Estimate SE L U
Intercept (HH teams) 0.92 0.29 1.50 0.36
HL teams 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.94
LL teams 1.11 0.35 0.44 1.81
Round 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.09
s 1.18 0.17 0.88 1.52
Note. HH ¼ pair of two high rule-followers; HL ¼ mixed pair of one person
scoring high on rule following paired with one person scoring low on rule
following; LL¼ pair of two low rule-followers. s refers to the error term on
the team level. There is no individual-decision and subject-level error term
because of the logistic regression model and because reported doubles are
measured on the dyadic level.
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the sample into individuals who scored high on rule following
(H) or low on rule following (L) based on the median rule
following (median¼ 20 balls, as in Experiment 2). They were
reinvited after 16 days, on average, to perform the dyadic die-
rolling task in groups of four. We assigned subjects to groups
of four high rule-followers (HHHH groups, n ¼ 36), four low
rule-followers (LLLL groups, n¼ 36), groups with a majority
of high rule-followers (HHHL groups, n¼ 48), or groups with
a majority of low rule-followers (LLLH groups, n¼ 48). Prior
to participation, participants only knew that the second part of
the experiment would take 60 min and that they would interact
with other participants.
Each group performed the dyadic die-rolling task for 30
rounds in alternating pairs. In each round, participants were
reassigned to a different role (first mover/second mover) and
partner based on a predefined schedule that ensured that each
group member interacted with each other group member as
first mover and second mover once after every six consecu-
tive rounds, and 10 times in total (5 times as first mover, 5
times as second mover), leading to a total of 30 rounds for
each subject. Hence, in each round, each participant inter-
acted with one other participant of the group in a team of
two. If the team reported to have rolled exactly the same
number (a “double”), they got paid according to the worth
of the double. This procedure ensured that the payoff func-
tion and incentives of collaborative cheating stayed exactly
the same across Experiments 2 and 3. As in Experiment 2,
Participants did not know about the behavior of their inter-
action partner in Part 1 (i.e., their private preferences for
following or violating rules). Also as in Experiment 2, parti-
cipants were paid based on their decisions in the rule-
following task and one randomly selected round from the
dyadic die-rolling task in addition to their participation fee.
Participants were paid after the second session. Experimen-
ters could not monitor the behavior of participants in the first
or second session and only had information about the sum of
money that a participant earned after the second session to be
able to pay participants.
Analyses. Data were analyzed in the same way as Experiment
2 (see analyses section of Experiment 2), treating the data as
hierarchically clustered in subjects (Level 2) and groups
(Level 3). Compared with Experiment 2, we observed two
independent double reports per round and group and, hence,
fitted a second hierarchically clustered random intercept for
each group in the Bayesian logistic regressions modeling
reported doubles, similar to the regressions modeling die-
roll reports (see Equation 1). A frequentist approach based
on maximum likelihood estimation (as implemented in the
lme4 package in R) did not change the reported conclusions.
Results
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we found evidence of lying on the
sample level. The average die-roll reports were significantly
above what would be expected if the sample would have
reported honestly, M ¼ 3.99, one-sample t test, t(41) ¼
7.85, p < .001, two sided.
Reported numbers. Similar to Experiment 2, we found that a
group of low rule-followers reported higher numbers than a
group of high rule-followers (Figure 4a, Bayesian multilevel
regression, HHHH vs. LLLL, b ¼ 0.48, 95% CI ¼ [0.15,
0.81]; Table 3). Replacing one high rule-follower by a low
rule-follower in a group of high rule-followers did not sig-
nificantly change die-roll reports (Figure 4a, Bayesian multi-
level regression, HHHH vs. HHHL, b ¼ 0.08, 95%
CI ¼ [0.39, 0.23]; Table 3). Replacing one low rule-
follower by a high rule-follower in a group of low rule-
followers also did not significantly change die-roll reports
(Figure 4a, Bayesian multilevel regression, LLLL vs. LLLH,
b¼0.17, 95% CI¼ [0.48, 0.14]). We should, however, be
cautious with interpreting average die-reports, because the
expectation of die-roll reports in mixed groups, even when
assuming no social influence between different types, is not
simply the average of what we would expect for pure low
versus high follower groups (see supplemental material for
the derivation). Instead, double rates and individual-level set-
ting and getting behavior allow to derive unbiased conclusions
to which degree minorities influence group-level behavior.
Doubles. Whereas a group of low rule-followers reported
more doubles than a group of high rule-followers (64% vs.
37%, Figure 4b, Bayesian multilevel regression, HHHH vs.
LLLL, b¼ 1.23, 95% CI¼ [0.53, 1.92]; Table 4), adding one
high rule-follower to a group of low rule-followers signifi-
cantly reduced the likelihood to report doubles (64% vs.
50%, Figure 4b, Bayesian multilevel regression, LLLL vs.
LLLH, b ¼ 0.64, 95% CI ¼ [1.28, 0.01]), whereas
adding one low rule-follower to a group of high rule-
followers did not (37% vs. 38%, Figure 4b, Bayesian multi-
level regression, HHHH vs. HHHL, b ¼ 0.05, 95%
CI ¼ [0.60, 0.70]; Table 4).
Experiment 3 also allows us to directly investigate
whether the presence of a single participant scoring high
on rule following influences how pairs of low rule-
followers interact with each other. In groups of low rule-
followers, low rule-follower pairs reported to have thrown
a double in 64% of the rounds. Pairs of two low rule-
followers reported 10% less doubles when one high rule-
follower was present in the group. The other way around, a
group of high rule-followers reported in 37% of the rounds to
have thrown a double. When one low rule-follower was
present in the group, the double rate of two high rule-
followers, interacting with each other, remained unchanged
(37% of the rounds). Thus, the presence of one high rule-
follower had a spillover effect on two low rule-followers
interacting with each other, resonating with literature show-
ing a social influence advantage for (minority) positions that
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display societal norms and socially approved practices
(Bazarova et al., 2011).
Figure 4c and 4d show that first mover reports (“setting
the stage”) and second movers’ matching likelihood
(“getting the job done”) were relatively constant for high
rule-followers, regardless of whether they were in a group
of like-minded high rule-followers, a group with one low
rule-follower, or a group of low rule-followers. Accordingly,
and in line with the findings from Experiment 2, we did not
find statistical evidence that “setting” and “getting” behavior
of high rule-followers was influenced by the number of low
rule-followers in their group (Figure 4c: setting the stage,
Bayesian multilevel regression, b ¼ 0.13, 95% CI ¼
[0.53, 0.26]; Figure 4d, getting the job done, Bayesian
multilevel regression, b ¼ 0.03, 95% CI ¼ [0.42,
0.35]). We also found only marginal evidence that first
mover die-roll reports of low rule-followers were influenced
by the number of high rule-followers in a group (Figure 4c:
setting the stage, Bayesian multilevel regression, b ¼ 0.36,
95% CI ¼ [0.03, 0.76]). However, second movers scoring
low on rule following systematically decreased their likeli-
hood of matching the first movers report (“getting the job





















































































Figure 4. Rule following and collaborative cheating in groups.
Average die-roll reports (a) and average percentage of doubles (b) across conditions. HHHH ¼ group of four participants scoring high on rule
following, LLLL ¼ group of four participants scoring low on rule following, HHHL ¼ group of high rule-followers with one low rule-follower,
LLLH¼ group of low rule-followers with one high rule-follower. White lines indicate expectation based on chance (i.e., fully honesty). Average
die-roll reports of first movers (“setting the stage”; c) and percentage of matching the number reported by the first mover (“getting the job
done”; d) of low rule-follower (black) and high rule-followers (blue) when interacting with the same types (homogeneous group), with a
majority of same types (majority group), or the opposite types (minority group). Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
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done”) the more participants scoring high on rule following
were in the group (Figure 4d, Bayesian multilevel regression,
b ¼ 0.41, 95% CI ¼ [0.02, 0.78]).
Discussion
Experiment 3 provided further evidence for the transmission
advantage of honesty compared with cheating through a per-
son  situation interaction. Similar to Experiment 2, groups
of low rule-followers engaged in more collaborative cheating
than groups of high rule-followers. Yet, replacing one low
rule-follower with a high rule-follower reduced collaborative
cheating in low rule-follower groups, whereas collaborative
cheating remained on a similar level when replacing one
high rule-follower with a low rule-follower in high rule-
follower groups. Already in a minority position, high rule-
followers mitigated collaborative cheating and increased
honest interactions.
The asymmetric spreading of honesty was mainly driven
by low rule-followers lowering their propensity to “getting
the job done,” that is, to match the reports of their interaction
partner when a high rule-follower was present in the group.
The behavior of high rule-followers, however, was largely
immune to the composition of the group. Furthermore, the
presence of a high rule-follower reduced collaborative cheat-
ing among low rule-follower pairs but not the other way
around. This finding is noteworthy because high and low
rule-followers were not identifiable to one another other than
through their behavior, and shows that interactions between
high and low rule-followers influenced and spilled over to
interactions between two low rule-followers.
General Discussion
The human capacity for cooperation and coordinated joint
action enables groups to perform and create well beyond what
people can achieve individually (Gross & De Dreu, 2019).
Unfortunately, however, coordinated joint action within
groups can take a more destructive form when interacting
individuals initiate, endorse, and reinforce deceitful behavior,
creating opportunities for collaborative cheating that benefit
group members, often at the expense of the broader collective
within which groups operate (Goodman, 2015; Gross et al.,
2018b). Here, in controlled laboratory settings, we likewise
observed substantial levels of collaborative cheating. Across
Experiments 2 and 3, dyads reported to have thrown doubles
every second round on average; under chance level, a double
should occur only every six rounds on average. This finding
resonates with previous research on the high prevalence of
deceitful behavior in groups (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009; Conrads
et al., 2013; Gino et al., 2009, 2013; Kocher et al., 2017;
Weisel & Shalvi, 2015).
The puzzle emerging from these and related findings is
that collaborative cheating and social slippery slopes exist
next to seemingly sticky societal norms for honesty. This
puzzle cannot be resolved by assuming that individuals—
some more than others perhaps—have social preferences,
including concerns for other’s welfare and fairness. Indeed,
social preferences would lead people to endorse both
societal-level norms of honesty and fairness and reinforce
mutually beneficial attempts at collaborative cheating (Flee-
son et al., 2014; Heck et al., 2018; Hilbig & Zettler, 2015;
Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). Instead, we propose that societal-
level norms for honesty can persist and spread because some
people are willing to follow rules, even when rule following
is personally costly and cheating is in the dyad’s best interest.
Across experiments, we replicated that people differ in
rule following. Experiment 1 showed that individuals with
higher rule-following propensity are more likely to behave
honestly, and Experiments 2 and 3 showed that individuals
Table 3. Random-Effects Regression Predicting Die-Roll Reports
Based on Group Composition.
95% CI
Coefficient Estimate SE L U
Intercept (HHHH groups) 3.82 0.13 3.57 4.07
HHHL groups 0.08 0.16 0.39 0.23
LLLH groups 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.62
LLLL groups 0.48 0.17 0.15 0.81
Round 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
slevel 1 1.65 0.02 1.62 1.69
slevel 2 0.43 0.04 0.35 0.51
slevel 3 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.37
Note. HHHH ¼ group of four participants scoring high on rule following.
LLLL ¼ group of four participants scoring low on rule following. HHHL ¼
group of three high rule-followers with one low rule-follower. LLLH ¼
group of three low rule-followers with one high rule-follower. s refers to
the error term on the individual-decision level (Level 1), subject level
(Level 2), or group level (Level 3).
Table 4. Random-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Double
Reports Based on Group Composition.
95% CI
Coefficient Estimate SE L U
Intercept (HHHH groups) 0.66 0.26 1.18 0.15
HHHL groups 0.05 0.33 0.60 0.70
LLLH groups 0.59 0.33 0.06 1.22
LLLL groups 1.23 0.35 0.53 1.92
Round 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
slevel 2 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.27
slevel 3 0.67 0.10 0.50 0.89
Note. HHHH ¼ group of four participants scoring high on rule following.
LLLL ¼ group of four participants scoring low on rule following. HHHL ¼
group of three high rule-followers with one low rule-follower. LLLH ¼
group of three low rule-followers with one high rule-follower. s refers to
the error term on the subject level (Level 2) or group level (Level 3). There
is no individual-decision level error term because of the logistic regression
model.
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with higher rule-following propensity are more likely to
resist temptations to engage in collaborative cheating with
fellow group members. This asymmetric adaption to social
influence based on individual differences in rule following
creates a transmission advantage of honesty in mixed teams,
mitigating the frequency of collaborative cheating. Experi-
ment 3 further showed that honesty not only has a transmis-
sion advantage but also is more likely to spread than
cheating—pairs of two low rule-followers engaged in less
collaborative cheating when their group had a high rule-
follower among its members, whereas pairs of high rule-
followers did not engage in more collaborative cheating
when their group had a low rule-follower among its mem-
bers. Accordingly, rule following serves as a mechanism for
honesty to persist in the face of temptation, reducing the
likelihood of collaborative cheating and increasing the prob-
ability that honesty within groups is sustained.
Our experiments used a behavioral design with incenti-
vized interactions. This allowed us to explicitly model the
cost–benefit structure that underlies societal rules such as
honesty. Abiding by rules is often costly, whereas violating
rules provides beneficial shortcuts. For example, crossing a
red light can save time, avoiding taxes can save money, and
cheating on an exam can avoid the effort needed to master
the subject. Outside of the laboratory, rules are often both
costly and functional—following a rule such as driving on
the right (or left) side of the street is in the interest of every
individual (Bicchieri, 2005), and waiting in front of a red
traffic light reduces the risk of injury. The rule in the rule-
following task is rather abstract and we did not provide a
reason for following the rule (compared with other studies,
such as the classic Milgram experiment in which adminis-
tering electric shocks was motivated by the researcher’s
alleged interest in investigating learning effects). Providing
a reason or cover story to motivate rule following decreases
experimental control and can create interindividual differ-
ences in the degree to which participants believe that follow-
ing the rule is actually beneficial. The rule-following task,
hence, does not disguise its purpose and confronts partici-
pants with a clear cost–benefit conflict. Because the rule-
following task is quite new, we have little data on its external
validity (i.e., to which degree people that score high on rule
following also follow societal rules outside of the lab) com-
pared with the more established die-rolling task (for a gen-
eral discussion on the validity of economic games, see De
Dreu & Gross, 2019). Previous research, however, has
already shown that rule following predicts norm following
in social dilemmas and prosociality (Kimbrough & Vostro-
knutov, 2016, 2018), is correlated with personal need for
structure (Gross & De Dreu, 2017), and can be manipulated
through brain stimulation (Gross et al., 2018a). Yet, more
focused research is needed to establish a link between rule
following in and outside the lab. Accordingly, the strength of
our study lies in demonstrating that the rule-following task
has high internal validity. It can predict honesty, both on the
individual level and in dyadic interactions, and it can explain
differences in collaborative cheating.
Similar to the rule-following task, the die-rolling task
does not attempt to model all contingencies of dishonesty
that exist outside of the lab (e.g., lying detection and subse-
quent formal or informal punishment). We focused on a
situation in which lying remained private knowledge and
sanctions were absent. Our behavioral approach has to stay
silent on the exact psychological mechanism and possible
latent psychological moderators. Rule following as well as
cheating could be motivated, for example, by personal image
concerns. This would be akin to the idea that rule following
is, to different degrees, internalized and that violating rules
creates psychological disutility even when rule violations are
not observed or sanctioned. Alternatively, rule following and
cheating may be motivated by social image concerns, akin to
interindividual differences in the sensitivity to psychological
demand. Although our experimental procedures tried to
increase anonymity and reduce social image concerns, we
cannot disentangle whether high rule-followers were moti-
vated by pleasing the experimenter (social image concerns)
or because they habitually dislike breaking rules and cheat-
ing (personal image concerns). Future studies could also
investigate why low rule-followers adapt to high rule-
followers in collaborative settings. For example, the beha-
vior of high rule-followers may increase honesty by raising
self-awareness or social image concerns in low rule-
followers (Grossman & van der Weele, 2016). Future studies
could also investigate how personality traits such as hon-
esty–humility, conscientiousness, agreeableness, or ethical
convictions (e.g., Wiltermuth et al., 2013) relate to the beha-
vioral rule following.
Both our rule-following and cheating task model a situa-
tion in which a rule is at odds with personal self-interest. As
such, they measure a similar cost–benefit conflict, which
resonates with the results of Experiment 1. How this cost–
benefit conflict would be resolved in a social interaction was
not obvious and the aim of Experiments 2 and 3. In these
experiments, group composition was based on median
splits, labeling those scoring below the median as low
rule-followers and those scoring above the median as high
rule-follower (for a similar approach, see Kimbrough & Vos-
troknutov, 2016). Splitting individuals based on the median
allowed us to create an equal number of low- and high-type
teams. The downside is that the exact splitting point can vary
across samples, and categorizing individuals based on a con-
tinuous measure disregards within-category differences in
rule following. It is, therefore, important to interpret results
in terms of relative differences in rule following. This not-
withstanding, splitting our samples on the median means that
half of the sample interacted with the other half. If we
assume that people randomly meet, this split makes sense
and could explain when honesty norms are followed. Argu-
ably, through a process of self-selection, individuals can also
create “dishonest groups” versus “honest groups,”
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explaining why some corporations and institutions manifest
higher levels of rule breaking and corruption than others
(Goodman, 2015; Hanna & Wang, 2017). Indeed, forcing
people to switch partners prevents collaborative cheating
(Abbink, 2004; Gross et al., 2018b).
Our findings combined suggest that already small devia-
tions from median rule following can lead to collaborative
cheating and, perhaps, cultures of dishonesty and deception
(also see Pryor et al., 2019). Although people frequently
cheat and justify rule violations in a self-serving way (Dana
et al., 2006; Pittarello et al., 2015; Shalvi et al., 2011, 2015),
our findings show that already a minority of rule-followers
can foster rule abidance. This nonlinear transmission
advantage of honesty may explain how norms that are
not governed by formal laws can prevail in society
(Gaechter & Schulz, 2016)—displays of norm abidance
make honesty more binding and lead to more conformity,
outperforming the corrosive effect of norm deviations
(see also Bicchieri, 2005).
Conclusion
The functioning of groups and societies rely on the individ-
ual willingness to abide by sets of rules and regulations, to
honor trust, and to refrain from cheating (Bicchieri, 2005;
Gaechter & Schulz, 2016). Although more in some cultures
than others, rule following is often taught as virtuous and
promoted by shared narratives within societies (Gelfand
et al., 2011). Not all people are rule-followers—we observed
substantial variation even in the propensity to follow arbi-
trary rules. Yet, those who are following rules can serve an
important function: They can mitigate the emergence of
collaborative cheating. Rule-followers’ selective resilience
to social influence may enable norms of honesty and fairness
to persist and spread even when cheating is personally ben-
eficial and not formally sanctioned.
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